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There is now general agreement about the optionality of scalar implicatures: the
pragmatic interpretation will be accessed depending on the context relative to which
the utterance is interpreted. The question, then, is what makes a context upper- (vs.
lower-) bounding. Neo-Gricean accounts should predict that contexts including factual
information will enhance the rate of pragmatic interpretations. Post-Gricean accounts
should predict that contexts including psychological attributions will enhance the rate of
pragmatic interpretations. We tested two factors using the quantifier scale <all, some>:
(1) the existence of factual information that facilitates the computation of pragmatic
interpretations in the context (here, the cardinality of the domain of quantification)
and (2) the fact that the context makes the difference between the semantic and
the pragmatic interpretations of the target sentence relevant, involving psychological
attributions to the speaker (here a question using all). We did three experiments, all of
which suggest that while cardinality information may be necessary to the computation of
the pragmatic interpretation, it plays a minor role in triggering it; highlighting the contrast
between the pragmatic and the semantic interpretations, while it is not necessary
to the computation of the pragmatic interpretation, strongly mandates a pragmatic
interpretation. These results favor Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) post-Gricean account
over Chierchia’s (2013) neo-Gricean account. Overall, this suggests that highlighting
the relevance of the pragmatic vs. semantic interpretations of the target sentence
makes a context upper-bounding. Additionally, the results give a small advantage to the
post-Gricean account.
Keywords: scalar implicature, upper-bounding context, lower-bounding context, domain of quantification,
relevance, cardinality of domain of quantification
INTRODUCTION
Broadly speaking, context is the set of non-linguistic pieces of information that plays a role in
the interpretation of an utterance. As such, it can include any relevant extralinguistic information,
from notions relative to the individual—his putative knowledge and/or his set of assumptions and
beliefs—to notions relative to the physical environment in which the conversation is taking place.
Although there is wide agreement that the meaning of utterances (their truth-conditions) varies
somewhat according to the context in which they are uttered, the extent of this variation is disputed.
While contextualism argues that the context’s contribution to the truth-conditional meaning of
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an utterance is substantial, minimal semanticists (e.g., Borg,
2004, 2012) argue that pragmatic processing plays a very limited
role in semantic content. Although contextualism has become
the dominant paradigm in the philosophy of language, it
has also raised strong interrogations relative to the semantic-
pragmatic interface in linguistics. This debate has been dubbed
the “border wars” (see Horn, 2006) and has mainly centered on
implicatures.
Grice (1989) introduced the notion of implicature. One
utterance can have a semantic meaning (i.e., linguistic or
conventional meaning) and a speaker meaning (i.e., the content
the speaker intends to communicate), an implicature. Grice
claimed that adult native speakers of a language easily retrieve the
additional implicit meaning because communication is governed
by a set of tacit maxims, summed up under the Cooperative
Principle. The hearer goes beyond what the speaker literally
said to recover a meaning compatible with the assumption that
the speaker complied with the maxims. According to Grice, to
compute a conversational implicature, a hearer must take into
account both what the speaker said and what he could have said.
The reasoning is thus based on both the actual utterance and its
possible alternatives.
Grice proposed a further distinction among conversational
implicatures based on how the alternatives are determined. He
divided them into Particularized Conversational Implicatures
(PCIs) and Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs).
According to him, PCIs are heavily context-dependent [the
alternative utterances are determined by the context, as in
(2)], whereas GCIs are not context-dependent [the alternative
utterances are lexically determined, as in (3)]. Logical words—
such as or and some—typically trigger a GCI:
(1) Where does Anne live?
(2) Somewhere in Burgundy, I believe.
(3) The pianist played some Mozart sonatas. [Implicature: He
did not play all of them.]
The Gricean distinction between PCIs and GCIs has constituted
the main battleground for the “border wars” between neo-
Griceans1 (Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2004, 2006)—who endorse the
distinction between PCIs and GCIs—and post-Griceans (Sperber
and Wilson, 1995, (Noveck and Sperber, 2007))—who reject it
and claim that all implicatures are context-dependent.
The neo-Griceans have defended their view by proposing
a lexicalist account, according to which lexical triggers belong
to scales, e.g., <all, some> <and, or>, where the weaker
terms implicate the negation of the stronger terms, producing a
scalar implicature (SI; for a general overview, see Horn, 2004).
Levinson (2000) proposed a strongly lexicalist model, according
to which weak scalar terms automatically trigger, as a default
interpretation, the SI: for instance, some will automatically be
interpreted as some, but not all. The semantic interpretation will
only be accessed when the SI is explicitly canceled.
1As we will see below, there are two types of neo-Gricean accounts: the lexicalist
neo-Gricean accounts, of which Levinson’s is the best example; and the syntax-
based accounts, of which Chierchia’s model (see Chierchia, 2004, 2013; Chierchia
et al., 2012) is the best example. The experimental literature has mainly targeted the
lexicalist model, although some results are also relevant for syntax-based accounts.
The theoretical predictions of the neo-Gricean and post-
Gricean views are fairly clear. On the one hand, neo-
Gricean accounts predict pragmatic interpretations at ceiling
and extremely low levels of semantic interpretations. They also
predict that drawing pragmatic interpretations will take less time
than drawing semantic interpretations. On the other hand, post-
Griceans make opposite predictions: pragmatic interpretations
will not be at ceiling and a number of semantic interpretations
should be expected. Additionally, pragmatic interpretations
should take longer than semantic interpretations.
On the whole, experimental evidence has not been favorable
to the neo-Gricean default account. The results showed a strong
residual percentage of lower-bounded, semantic, interpretations
(20–40% depending on the experimental paradigm; see e.g.,
Bott and Noveck, 2004; Feeney et al., 2004; Pouscoulous et al.,
2007). This has been interpreted as showing that GCIs are
context-dependent to a degree and has called into question
the Gricean distinction between GCIs and PCIs. Regarding
interpretive cost, even though most results seemed to show that
the semantic interpretation is more readily and easily (lower
RTs) accessed than the pragmatic interpretation—which suggests
that the pragmatic meaning has a higher processing cost than
the semantic meaning (see e.g., Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott
and Noveck, 2004; Breheny et al., 2006; Huang and Snedeker,
2009, 2011; Bott et al., 2012)—, it is important to note that
there is conflicting evidence in the literature (see Grodner
et al., 2010, who shows that, given an appropriate context, the
pragmatic interpretation is not more costly than the semantic
interpretation). Concerning development, an early batch of
experiments seemed to show a clear developmental trajectory
with fewer pragmatic interpretations among younger children
and an increase with age (see e.g., Gualmini et al., 2001; Noveck,
2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003; Guasti et al., 2005;
Pouscoulous et al., 2007). However, some studies have shown
that even young children (4–5-year-olds) can produce pragmatic
interpretations at the adult level (Feeney et al., 2004; Papafragou
and Tantalou, 2004; Katsos and Bishop, 2011; Foppolo et al.,
2012). This suggests that it is not pragmatic competence per
se that children lack and that their low number of pragmatic
interpretations in some tasks may be due to task demands.
While RT and developmental evidence may be seen as
ambiguous, the rate of pragmatic interpretations is, in itself,
a strong argument against the lexicalist neo-Gricean accounts
(Levinson, 2000). One might have thought that this would
be the end of the border wars. However, these results are
compatible with Chierchia’s (2004, 2013; Chierchia et al., 2012)
syntax-based account, especially in its last version (Chierchia,
2013). According to Chierchia (2013), a silent grammatical
exhaustification operator (≈ only) applies on a set of alternatives
on a context-dependent basis. In other words, the context will or
will not make the set of alternatives available to the operator.
Thus, now, there seems to be an agreement between the neo-
Gricean account (Chierchia, 2013) and the post-Gricean account
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Noveck and Sperber, 2007) on the
fact that the process of implicature retrieval is context-dependent.
However, there still remains a major difference between the two
accounts, as there is still no agreement as to the mecanism itself.
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For neo-Griceans, the process of exhaustification is grammar-
driven: a silent grammatical exhaustification operator (≈ only)
applies on a set of alternatives on a context dependent basis.
In other words, the context will or will not make the set
of alternatives available to the operator. For post-Griceans, it
is a pragmatic enrichment process, whereby the logical form
(corresponding to the semantic interpretation) is strengthened,
leading to the pragmatic interpretation. Note that even on
the post-Gricean interpretation, all things being equal, the
enrichment will always lead to the same interpretation, i.e., the
negation of the stronger terms on the scale. Thus, though in
Recanati’s (2004) terms, the process of enrichment is optional, the
result of the process does not vary according to the context for
scalar implicatures.
Yet, there seems to be a way of testing the two accounts at the
contextual level. Chierchia (2013) remains very cautious relative
to how the context-dependency of the mechanism works and
relative to the nature of the context (what kind of information it
can include). Other semanticists (see Borg, 2004, 2012; Stanley,
2007) who also accept a modicum of context-dependency for
semantics claim that grammar-based processes can only depend
on factual contexts that exclude mental state attributions. This
limitation does not exist in the post-Gricean view, where the
context can include such psychological attributions. This suggests
that a way of approaching this new border war between neo- and
post-Gricean account would be to see whether upper-bounding
contexts (i.e., contexts that enhance the rate of pragmatic
interpretations) include factual information vs. psychological
attribution (see below).
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN THE
DERIVATION OF GCIs
Let us call contexts that favor a semantic interpretation lower-
bounding contexts and those that favor a pragmatic interpretation
upper-bouding contexts. What remains unclear is what makes a
context upper- or lower-bounding. It is precisely this question
that the present paper targets with the aim of contributing to the
latest version of the border wars. Studies addressing this issue
have mainly targeted children2 and aimed to identify the factors
that increase the rate of pragmatic interpretation. From those
studies, three main factors have emerged:
• The explicitness of the cardinality of the domain of
quantification—e.g., The boy has five cars (Feeney et al., 2004;
Papafragou and Tantalou, 2004; Skordos, 2014);
• The conversational relevance of the contrast between the
weaker term and the stronger term on a scale (Feeney et al.,
2004; Papafragou and Tantalou, 2004; Skordos, 20143);
2Those studies aimed at improving children’s rate of pragmatic interpretations.
3In Feeney et al. (2004), the contrast was made relevant by including an element
of deception: the character who uttered the underinformative sentence clearly
intended to mislead her hearer by letting her believe that she had not, e.g., eaten all
the sweets but only some of them. Papafragou and Tantalou (2004) highlighted this
by the fact that the participant had to decide whether the character should receive
a prize based on the fact that the character had, e.g., painted all the stars.
• The accessibility of the alternative set (Barner et al., 2011;
Aravind and de Villiers, 2014; Skordos, 2014)4.
While there is a general consensus that the third factor (the
accessibility of the alternative set) is not relevant to adults in
regards to SIs (Aravind and de Villiers, 2014; Skordos, 2014), the
first two factors are central to our investigation, as they constitute
respectively a factual context and a psychological context5.
Quantifiers are normally interpreted relative to a contextually
determined Domain of Quantification (DQ), which basically
indicates the set of objects over which the quantifier quantifies.
Additionally, the cardinality of the DQ (howmany objects should
be considered) is necessary to verify whether all or only some of
the objects in the DQ are affected by a given process. For example,
in Feeney et al. (2004), the experimental material is as follows:
(4) Charlotte finds three sweets [our emphasis] on the kitchen
table. Charlotte likes sweets. Charlotte eats the first sweet.
Charlotte eats the second sweet. Charlotte eats the third sweet.
Charlotte’s Mum says, “Charlotte, what have you been doing
with the sweets?” Charlotte says: “I’ve eaten some of the
sweets.”
The mention of DQ-cardinality in the first sentence allows
participants to verify that in the course of the story, the character
has exhausted all the originally present items (here, the three
sweets). In other words, DQ-cardinality is a necessary factor
in SIs based on the quantifier scale. In addition, explicitly
mentioning DQ-cardinality in the first sentence, as well as
counting the objects in the following sentences [as in (4)]
should make it obvious to the hearer that all the objects in
the DQ are affected, which, arguably, should favor a pragmatic
interpretation. This then will be the kind of context that, on a
neo-Gricean account (Chierchia, 2013), should enhance the rate
of pragmatic interpretations.
By contrast, while making the contrast between the semantic
and the pragmatic interpretations relevant may encourage the
derivation of pragmatic answers, it is not necessary because
adults can produce pragmatic answers even when the contrast
is absent. For instance, for the categorical sentences used
by Noveck (2001, e.g., Some elephants have trunks), which
does not make the contrast between a pragmatic and a
semantic answer relevant in and of itself, adults gave 59%
of pragmatic responses when answering the question Do you
agree?. Making the contrast between the pragmatic and the
semantic interpretations relevant would also not be sufficient
in the absence of DQ-cardinality, as participants could not
check whether all or only some of the objects in the DQ are
affected. But, on a post-Gricean account (Sperber and Wilson,
1995; Noveck and Sperber, 2007), this type of context should
enhance the rate of pragmatic interpretations. This is because,
on Relevance Theory, the interpretation process only stops
when an interpretation consistent with the presumption that
4Skordos (2014) manipulated the order of the experimental items in such a way
that every underinformative some item was preceded by an all item, making the
alternative to some Xs (all Xs) more accessible.
5The notion of relevance is relative to an utterance and expectations of relevance
depend on the intentions the hearer attributes to the speaker.
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the utterance is optimally relevant (achieving a balance between
interpretive costs and benefits) has been reached. When an
upper-bounding question is present in the context, it is clear
that satisfying that condition entails accessing the pragmatic
interpretation.
Thus, we propose to combine the presence or absence of an
explicit mention of cardinality in the context with the presence
of another element in the context that does or does not make
the contrast between the weaker and the stronger term (e.g.,
some and all) conversationally relevant. We choose to use a
question because, theoretically, questions have been deemed to
clearly indicate the type of answer that would be relevant to the
speaker, and the hearer recovers that information throughmental
state attribution. Wilson (2000), following Sperber and Wilson
(1995), proposed that questions are the metarepresentational
counterparts of imperatives, representing desirable thoughts or, in
other words, relevant answers. This view comes very close to the
notion of Question-Under-Discussion (QUD: see Roberts, 2004).
A question featuring all indicates how the hearer’s reply (the
target sentence) can be relevant—by saying whether the action
affects all or only some of the objects in the DQ—whereas a
lower-bounding question does not indicate whether the speaker
is interested in knowing whether only some or all of the objects
in the DQ are affected. Hence, a lower-bounding question (using
the indefinite plural determiner) does not make the difference
between a semantic and a pragmatic interpretation relevant and
thus does not encourage the participant to access the pragmatic
interpretation. In the following experiments, we compare
pragmatic and semantic interpretations of underinformative
utterances (SIs) in the following cases:
• When the cardinality of the DQ is either explicitly indicated
(e.g., “The boy has five candies”) or not (“The boy has Ø
candies”);
• When there is either an upper-bounding question (e.g., “Has
the boy eaten all the candies?”) or a lower-bounding question
(“Has the boy eatenØ candies?”).
Given the above discussion on the kind of contexts that the
neo- and the post-Gricean accounts will accept—the neo-
Griceans favoring factual contexts, while the post-Griceans favor
psychological contexts—, the two accounts will make different
predictions (where “>” meansmore pragmatic interpretations):
Neo-Gricean account: (DQ-cardinality and upper-
bounding question = DQ-cardinality and lower-bounding
question) > (No DQ-cardinality and upper-bounding
question=NoDQ-cardinality and lower-bounding question).
Post-Gricean account: (DQ-cardinality and upper-bounding
question = No DQ-cardinality and upper-bounding
question) > (DQ-cardinality and lower-bounding question =
No DQ-cardinality and lower-bounding question).
In other words, the neo-Gricean account predicts that
an upper-bounding question will make no difference to
the rate of pragmatic interpretations, while the post-
Gricean account predicts that an explicit mention of





Eighty participants (53 women and 27 men) were recruited from
the area around Lyon, France. The participants were between 18
and 26 years of age (mean age: 21.6) and were either students
or young graduates. All were native French speakers and had
normal or corrected to normal vision. They participated in the
experiment on a voluntary basis6 and received a gratification of
10 euros. The experiment lasted approximately 15min.
Stimuli and Procedure
To investigate the role of the two contextual elements and
the impact of their interactions on the derivation of the
pragmatic interpretation of the quantifier some, we used a simple
verification task. The experiment was displayed on a computer
screen and took place entirely in French, although the English
translations are presented in the paper7. As the experiment was
self-paced, the participants had to press the spacebar to move
from one slide to the next. They could also go back if desired by
pressing the left arrow key.
The experiment proceeded as follows: the participants were
presented with a story narrated through six image-sentence
pairs and then saw a puppet named Lilo ask a question
about the output of the story. Immediately following Lilo’s
question, another puppet (Pipo) appeared on the screen and
answered the question using an underinformative sentence
(target sentence). The participants were asked to judge Pipo’s
sentence by answering Yes or No to the question “Is Pipo right?”
The answers were recorded automatically by the computer
program. To illustrate, the experiment proceeded as illustrated
in Figure 1.
In addition to the test items (in which the weak term some
was used when the stronger term all would have been more
appropriate), there were three non-target types of sentences that
served as controls: two in which all was used (one in which
the target sentence was true and one in which it was false) and
one in which some was used and was felicitous. There were thus
infelicitous some, felicitous some, false all and true all items in each
condition.
For each participant, the experimental sentences were ordered
randomly from a base of 4 stories for the three control types of
items (true all, false all and felicitous some) and 8 stories for the
test items (infelicitous some). Thus, there was a total of 20 stories
per participant.
Design
The experiment followed a 2 × 2 mixed design with Cardinality
as a between-subjects variable (Card vs. NoCard) andQuestion as
a within-subjects variable (Lower-bounding vs. Upper-bounding
6This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the
Comité de Protection des Personnes Sud Est II, which granted its agreement with
the study (IRB number: 11263). All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
7All the materials used in the experiments presented in this paper can be found in
the Appendix of Supplementary Material, where it is presented in French with an
English translation.
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FIGURE 1 | An example of a storyboard used in Experiment 1.
TABLE 1 | The four experimental conditions of Experiment 1.
Cardinality (N = 40) No cardinality (N = 40)
Lower-bounding question Upper-bounding question Lower-bounding question Upper-bounding question
First sentence The boy has five cars. The boy has five cars. The boy has ø cars. The boy has ø cars.
Lilo’s question Did the boy hide ø cars? Did the boy hide all the cars? Did the boy hide ø cars? Did the boy hide all the cars?
Target sentence The boy has hidden some cars. The boy has hidden some cars. The boy has hidden some cars. The boy has hidden some cars.
question), resulting in four conditions. The variations concerned
the first sentence of the story (in which a cardinal number was
specified or not specified) and the question asked by Lilo, which
was either upper-bounding or lower-bounding (see Table 1). We
tested 40 participants in the Card condition and 40 participants
in the NoCard condition.
Results and Discussion
As the non-target types of sentences were used to assess the
understanding of the task, the proportions of yes and no
responses were converted into correct and incorrect responses.
The accuracy rate for the various control sentences was 94%,
showing that the task was correctly understood. The data from
3 participants who provided incorrect answers to 4 or more of
the control stimuli were discarded.
We were interested in the acceptance (semantic responses)
or rejection (pragmatic responses) of the underinformative
some target sentences. The responses were coded for pragmatic
correctness, that is, an answer of no to the underinformative
sentences. Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of pragmatic
answers for each of the four versions of the experiment.
The statistical analysis revealed a significant effect of the
question: an upper-bounding question triggered significantly
more pragmatic answers than a lower-bounding question
both when the cardinality of the DQ was explicitly stated
(Medianupper−bounding = 4, Medianlower−bounding = 2, Wilcoxon
signed-ranks, Z = 3.997, p < 0.001) and when it was not
(Medianupper−bounding = 4, Medianlower−bounding = 3, Wilcoxon
signed-ranks, Z = 3.327, p < 0.001). A Mann-Whitney test
was then performed to assess the role of the cardinality. No
significant effect was found in either of the conditions (upper-
bounding condition: Mediancard = 4, Mediannocard = 4, U =
700.5, p = 0.548; lower-bounding question: Mediancard = 2,
Mediannocard = 3, U = 656, p = 0.296).
In this experiment, we observed a significant effect of the
question type on the rate of pragmatic answers but no impact
of the cardinality of the DQ. Indeed, the two conditions
with an upper-bounding question triggered significantly more
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pragmatic interpretations than the two conditions with a lower-
bounding question, regardless of whether they were combined
with an indication of cardinality. This result might suggest that
cardinality plays a minor role (if any) in the computation of
the SIs. However, an alternative explanation is that the effect of
the question is so strong that it overrides any potential effect
of the cardinality. To determine whether this is, indeed, the
case, we conducted a second experiment in which we erased the
conversational context.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of pragmatic answers per condition in
Experiment 1 (N = 77). Error bars indicate SEM.
Experiment 2
Participants
For this second experiment, 60 participants (aged between 18
and 25 years; mean age: 21.1) were recruited. There were 16
males and 44 females. The participants were either students or
young graduates from the Universities of Lyon and Bordeaux,
France. They were native French speakers, had no background
in linguistics and had normal or corrected to normal vision.
They participated in the experiment voluntarily and were paid
10 euros.
Stimuli and Procedure
To ensure consistency, minimal changes were made to the
original design: the same 20 stories (sets of sentence-image pairs
describing a sequence of actions: 8 test stories and 12 control
stories) and the same procedure were used. The main difference
between this experiment and Experiment 1 was the absence
of the question. After the participants viewed the six image-
sentence pairs, they were directly presented with the puppet
uttering the target, underinformative sentence and were asked
whether the puppet’s description of the story was correct: the
target sentence was simply presented as a comment on the
story.
The storyboard in Experiment 2 is presented below (see
Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 | The storyboard used in Experiment 2.
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TABLE 2 | The three experimental conditions of Experiment 2.
Card (N = 20) NoCard (N = 20) NoNumber (N = 20)
Cardinality (first sentence) The boy has five cars. The boy has ø cars. The boy has ø cars.
Other image-sentence pairs He hides one car.
He hides the second car.
He hides the third car.
He hides the fourth car.
He hides the fifth car.
He hides one car.
He hides the second car.
He hides the third car.
He hides the fourth car.
He hides the fifth car.
He hides one of the cars.
He hides one of the cars.
He hides one of the cars.
He hides one of the cars.
He hides one of the cars.
Target sentence The boy has hidden some cars. The boy has hidden some cars. The boy has hidden some cars.
FIGURE 4 | Percentage of pragmatic answers per condition in
Experiment 2 (n = 57). Error bars indicate SEM.
Design
Three conditions were compared: one in which DQ-cardinality
is mentioned in the first sentence-image pair and the rest of the
context is the same as that in Experiment 1 (notwithstanding
the absence of a question); one in which DQ-cardinality is
not mentioned in the first sentence-image pair and the rest of
the context is identical to that in Experiment 1; and one in
which DQ-cardinality is not mentioned in the first sentence-
image pair and the successive sentences do not number the
objects (see Table 2). This last condition was added in case
the fact that the object is numbered in the descriptions of
each sequential event in the story alerted participants of DQ-
cardinality.
Each participant was tested in only one condition, and there
were 20 participants per condition.
Results and Discussion
The participants answered the control sentences with an accuracy
rate of 96%. The data from three participants had to be
discarded because these participants gave too many incorrect
responses in the three control conditions. Again, the rejection
rate of underinformative responses represented the percentage of
pragmatic answers (see Figure 4).
The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by Ranks and Median Test
showed no significant difference in the rate of pragmatic answers
between the different conditions, H(2) = 0.0595, p = 0.970, with
a mean rank of 10 for the Card and NoCard conditions and 8 for
the NoNumber condition.
In the first experiment, for which the neo-Gricean account
predicts an effect of the cardinality of the DQ, we only obtained
an effect of upper- vs. lower-bounding question. These results
suggest that the cardinality of the DQ plays (at most) a minor
role in the derivation of pragmatic interpretations for quantifier-
based SIs. To test that hypothesis, we ran a second experiment in
which we compared three conditions in the absence of a question:
one condition in which the cardinality was explicitly indicated
(Card), one in which it was not (NoCard) and one in which
neither cardinality nor number was indicated (NoNumber).
Because the Card condition does not lead to significantly more
pragmatic interpretations than the NoCard condition, we can
conclude that DQ-cardinality does not play a major role in the
access of pragmatic interpretations. This is further evidenced by
the fact that the results remain unchanged if we do not state any
numbers explicitly (NoNumber).
A potential limitation of our study however is that
in Experiment 1, the lower- vs. upper-bounding question
comparison involved a within-subjects design. This raises two
concerns: (a) it makes the comparison between the within-
subjects conditions and the between-subjects conditions difficult
and (b) it creates a strong pragmatic contrast between the two
types of questions, which could have an impact on the rate of
rejection of underinformative statements: the difference observed
in the rate of rejection of underinformative statements could well
be due to the contrast between the question types rather than the
question type by itself. To rule out this possibility, we conducted
a follow-up experiment in which the question type (upper- vs.
lower-bounding) was manipulated as a between-subjects factor.
Experiment 3
Participants
Forty undergraduate students from Lyon University participated
in this experiment (mean age: 21.05; 8 were male). All
participants were native French speakers, had normal or
corrected to-normal visual acuity, and were given 10 euros for
participation.
Stimuli and Design
This experiment used the same stimuli as that used in Experiment
1, but the design was slightly changed to make the question type
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TABLE 3 | The two experimental conditions of Experiment 3.
Lower-bounding (N = 20) Upper-bounding (N = 20)
First sentence The boy has ø cars The boy has ø cars
Lilo’s question Did the boy hide ø cars? Did the boy hide all the cars?
a between-subjects variable. The participants were still presented
with the six images and their verbal descriptions and the two
puppets. However, in this experiment, each participant saw Lilo
ask the same type of question (either lower-bounding or upper-
bounding) for the whole trial (see Table 3).
As familiarity with the question type was a concern, some
changes were made to the fillers: instead of using upper- or
lower-bounding questions in the control sentences, the questions
contained the French plural definite article “les” and the French
singular indefinite article “un.”
Results and Discussion
The participants correctly responded to 94 percent of the control
sentences. Four participants (2 in each condition) provided
incorrect answers for 4 out of 12 sentences in the control
conditions and were thus removed from the set of results. The
percentage of rejection of underinformative sentences was used
to calculate the rate of pragmatic responses (see Figure 5).
As in Experiment 1, a strong effect of the question type
on the rate of rejection of underinformative sentences
was observed, with upper-bounding questions triggering
significantly more pragmatic answers than lower-bounding
questions (Medianupper−bounding = 7.5 Medianlower−bounding =
1.5, Mann-Whitney test, U = 3.548, p < 0.001).
The results of Experiment 3 are fairly similar to those we
obtained in Experiment 1 and suggest that it is not the contrast
between the two types of questions that impacts the rate of
pragmatic answers but the question type itself. By changing the
design slightly, we have been able to rule out a possible alternative
explanation and to show that, indeed, the psychological
context plays a major role in the interpretation of scalar
implicatures.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As previously mentioned, both neo-Griceans (Chierchia,
2013) and post-Griceans (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Noveck
and Sperber, 2007) now agree that pragmatic interpretation
for SIs is context-dependent. Some contexts (the upper-
bounding contexts) make the pragmatic interpretation relevant,
encouraging hearers to make the necessary effort to access
it, whereas other contexts (the lower-bounding contexts) do
not. However, what makes a context upper-bounding remains
unclear and may make a difference between the two accounts.
We examined two factors: the presence of explicit information
that facilitates the computation of pragmatic information in the
context (DQ-cardinality) and the presence of an element that
makes both the information in question salient and the difference
between the pragmatic and the semantic interpretations relevant
in the context (upper-bounding question).
FIGURE 5 | Percentage of pragmatic answers per condition in
Experiment 3 (n = 36). Error bars indicate SEM.
Our view was that if DQ-cardinality was the main factor
triggering pragmatic answers, this would favor the neo-Gricean
account. By contrast, if the presence of an upper-bounding
question was the main factor triggering pragmatic answers, this
would favor the post-Gricean interpretation. The greater number
of pragmatic answers found in Experiments 1 and 3 was entirely
due to the upper-bounding question. Additionally, an explicit
mention of DQ-cardinality and object number in Experiment 2
did not result in differences between the three conditions (i.e.,
DQ-cardinality, no-DQ-cardinality, no-number). Thus, taken
together, these results suggest that DQ-cardinality plays a minor
role, or perhaps no role at all, in the derivation of pragmatic
interpretation in quantifier-based SIs.
This conclusion might, however, be premature. Indeed, our
contexts combined pictures and written sentences, which means
that the objects in the DQ were always visually represented
in the first sentence-picture. Moreover, DQ-cardinality was
immediately perceptible because the number of objects (five in
all the stories) is within the range of subitization8. One could
thus argue that DQ-cardinality is involved in the computation
of the pragmatic interpretation but that in cases in which it is
immediately perceptible through subitization, it does not have to
be explicitly mentioned. In other words, according to such an
hypothesis, DQ-cardinality would be available in all conditions
through subitization. Hence, the addition of an explicit mention
of DQ-cardinality would be redundant, and one would not expect
it to have an effect. In such a view, the upper-bounding question
would make the difference merely by making the information
relevant, regardless of whether it was made available through
language or through the visual scene. Thus, according to this line
of argumentation, the absence of a difference between the DQ-
cardinality/no DQ-cardinality conditions in Experiments 1 and 2
8Subitization is the process through which low numbers (1–5, minus or plus 2)
are perceived directly (visually) even though the relevant objects are not counted
(Kaufman et al., 1949).
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would not argue against the important role of DQ-cardinality in
the production of pragmatic interpretations.
This is compatible with the results we obtained: in this view,
one would expect the only difference in Experiments 1 and 3 to
be between the lower- and upper-bounding question conditions,
and this is exactly what we found. In the same way, one would
not expect the explicit mention of DQ-cardinality to result in a
difference between the three conditions in Experiment 2—given
that the information is visually available through subitization—
and this is the result that we obtained.
This issue is more complicated, however. If DQ-cardinality
was the major factor in the production of pragmatic
interpretation for quantifier-based SIs, one would certainly
expect a difference between the lower-bounding question and
the upper-bounding question conditions, such as the difference
we found in Experiments 1 and 3. However, one would also
expect a much higher level of pragmatic interpretations in the
lower-bounding question conditions in Experiments 1 and
3 and in all three conditions in Experiment 2 than what we
found. Indeed, the rates of pragmatic interpretations in both
lower-bounding question conditions in Experiments 1 and 3
and in all three conditions in Experiment 2 were fairly low
(between 40 and 50%). However, in the two upper-bounding
question conditions, the rates of pragmatic interpretation were
approximately 81% in Experiment 1 and approximately 95% in
Experiment 3. These results suggest that DQ-cardinality plays, at
most, a minor role in pragmatic interpretation and is certainly
far from sufficient to increase its occurrence.
The main trigger of pragmatic interpretations was the
presence of the upper-bounding question in the two conditions of
Experiments 1 and 3. But, how exactly does the upper-bounding
question foster pragmatic interpretation? In Section The Role
of Context in the Derivation of GCIs above, we assumed that
the upper-bounding question increases the rate of pragmatic
responses by increasing the relevance of the contrast between
the pragmatic and the semantic interpretations and the salience
of DQ-cardinality. The proposition that the upper-bounding
question makes DQ-cardinality relevant is rather convincing
given the results of the NoNumber condition in Experiment 2.
The results suggest that the DQ-cardinality and the number of
objects affected are (visually) processed and that participants are
aware of whether all or only some objects are affected. However,
themajority of participants will only use that piece of information
and give a pragmatic answer when they consider the pragmatic
answer relevant (i.e., in the upper-bounding condition), as shown
by the results of Experiments 1 and 3. This clearly agrees with the
prediction of the post-Gricean account (see Section The Role of
Context in the Derivation of GCIs above).
In other words, the upper-bounding question does not
make DQ-cardinality relevant; rather, DQ-cardinality becomes
relevant because the pragmatic answer is relevant. It should be
noted that this suggestion is compatible with our assumption
regarding DQ-cardinality: DQ-cardinality is a necessary
ingredient in the computation of pragmatic interpretation but
(contrary to the neo-Gricean prediction) is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to increase pragmatic interpretation.
As said above, both Chierchia’s (2013) neo-Gricean account
and Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) post-Gricean account accept
that access to the pragmatic interpretation is context-dependent.
What the present results suggest is that the main factor that
makes a context upper-bounding is that this context makes the
contrast between the two interpretations relevant. In addition,
on the view that grammatical mechanisms, while they can
be context-dependent, should depend on factual rather than
psychological contexts, our results are more consistent with the
post-Gricean account than with the neo-Gricean account.
In the present experiment, we have used questions based on
the relevance-theoretic view that questions provide the hearer
with an indication of how to make his answer relevant to the
speaker. This view comes very close to the notion of Question-
Under-Discussion (QUD), which, however, is not restricted to
questions. This notion can also apply to assertions, as assertions
can be characterized relative to which QUD they target. In other
words, while questions have the obvious advantage of making
the QUD explicit, other types of sentences might play the same
role in the building of an upper-bounding context. This suggests
that a further direction for research might be the examination of
the explicitness of the QUD when participants have to judge the
pragmatic felicity of underinformative utterances. We leave this
investigation for future research.
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